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LIBERALISM AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS
OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
LIBERALISM’S RELIGION. By Cécile Laborde.*
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2017.
Pp. 337. $36.00 (hardcover).
Abner S. Greene 1
INTRODUCTION
Every person reading this Review will have pondered, and
perhaps resolved, his or her religious identity. Some are devout,
and their relationship with and faith in God—in a higher power,
an extrahuman source of generative and normative authority—is
of central importance to who they are as human beings. Others
are still theists, of a sort, but their religiosity is more
backgrounded in their everyday lives. And yet others are
agnostic—open to theistic belief but not yet convinced—or
atheist, and denying God’s existence. In the United States, today,
these religious differences mostly do not lead to significant
conflict. But because the devout, the mildly religious, the agnostic,
and the atheist usually coexist in where they live and work, some
conflict based in religious belief and difference is inevitable. And
when the government is involved, such conflicts often take on a
constitutional dimension. To what extent may, or must, the state
acknowledge God’s existence and help theists in their quest to
have their religious beliefs be central to their existence? To what
extent may, or must, the state adjust its laws to help those for
whom God’s mandates should take precedence? For both types
* Nuffield Chair of Political Theory at the University of Oxford.
1. Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I dedicate this
Review in loving memory of my dear friend, John Nagle, from whom I learned so much
about religious devotion. For helpful written feedback on this essay, I thank Aditi Bagchi,
Jim Brudney, Clare Huntington, Cécile Laborde, Russ Pearce, Aaron Saiger, Micah
Schwartzman, Olivier Sylvain, and Nelson Tebbe. And I am very grateful to my Fordham
Law colleagues who participated in a Zoom virtual workshop on this Essay during the
novel coronavirus crisis.
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of question—what we under our Constitution sort under the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment—how do we best preserve the religious liberty of
those for whom God’s will competes with the state’s and those for
whom this is not the case, and who might be harmed by state
action aiding the devout?
When they arise, the conflicts are front-page news items.
Consider these, all cases that ended up at the United States
Supreme Court—Should the state be permitted to maintain a 32foot-high Latin cross on a large pedestal at a public highway
intersection?2 Should the state be permitted to use taxpayer
dollars to fund private secular but not religious schools?3 Must the
state exempt, from public accommodations anti-discrimination
law, a devoutly Christian baker who won’t make a custom cake
for a same-sex wedding celebration?4 Must the state permit
religious employers to opt out of providing the portion of group
health insurance that includes contraception, because the
employer deems the contraception an abortifacient? 5
Constitutional and statutory jurisprudence in the United
States has sought a middle ground between permitting the state
to achieve secular, sometimes liberal (as in “left of center”)
political ends, and ensuring robust religious liberty. In
Liberalism’s Religion, a work of political theory with important
intersections with U.S. law and religion jurisprudence, Cécile
Laborde confronts the establishment and free exercise dilemmas
that arise in a religiously heterogeneous liberal democracy. She
offers a middle-ground solution, permitting a small swath for state
acknowledgment of religion, and requiring a somewhat larger
space for state exemptions for religion from generally applicable
law. But she does this with barely a mention of God or theism.
This is because, for Laborde, the solution to the dilemmas a
religiously integrated liberal democracy face is, strikingly, to drop
religion out of the picture. I exaggerate, but only a bit. Laborde’s
thesis is that “we should disaggregate religion into a plurality of
different interpretive dimensions” (p. 2); she claims that “religion
is not uniquely special: whatever treatment it receives from the
2. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
3. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 WL 3518364 (U.S.
June 30, 2020).
4. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
5. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
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law, it receives in virtue of features that it shares with nonreligious
beliefs, conceptions, and identities” (p. 3). She casts her lot with
scholars such as Chris Eisgruber, Larry Sager, Micah
Schwartzman, and Nelson Tebbe, describing her approach as
“liberal egalitarianism”6 (p. 4; hereinafter “LE”). Thus, on the
nonestablishment side of things, the state should (for the most
part) not endorse or establish religion, but “only because it does
not establish or endorse any conception of the good in general”
(p. 5). For example, Laborde contends, “[a] state that enforces a
secular comprehensive conception of the good—Rawls’s favorite
example was a philosophy of Kantian autonomy, but we could
think of other comprehensive world-views, such as ecocentrism—
would fall foul of liberal legitimacy on exactly the same ground as
would a comprehensively religious state” (p. 145). And on the free
exercise side of things, the state should (sometimes) protect
religion, but “only as one of the ways in which citizens live a life
they think good” (p. 5). For example, Laborde says the following
situations that might give rise to exemption claims should at least
get to a balancing of individual versus state interest (and not be
excluded at the get-go), whether based in religion or other deep
commitments: “[a] parent sincerely believes that strict
discipline—including justly administered mild corporal
punishment—serves the moral edification of her child”; and “[a]
bakery owner . . . does not mind serving a gay customer but
objects to writing a pro-same-sex marriage slogan on the cake that
the customer wishes to purchase” (p. 211). In addition to casting
her lot with the LEs, Laborde describes a separate group of
scholars, such as Stanley Fish and Steven Smith, as “critical
religion theorists” (p. 14), focusing on their claims that there is no
stable, neutral governmental approach that does not involve the
state’s staking its own positions on matters of religion. 7
But Liberalism’s Religion devotes almost no space to an
important third position, which contends that religious belief and
practice are distinctive and deserving of distinctive legal
treatment. This “religion as distinctive” camp—of which I am a
6. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, R ELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE C ONSTITUTION (2007); NELSON TEBBE, R ELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN
EGALITARIAN AGE (2017); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012).
7. See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church
and State, 97 C OLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997); Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The
Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (book review).
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member 8—begins with recognizing that for many religious
people, God exists and their faith in and relationship to God is
front and center in their lives. For many religious people, belief in
God and what follows from that is not comparable to anything,
and cannot properly be disaggregated into just another set of
beliefs and practices. For the most devout religious people, God’s
being extrahuman is at the core of their lives and their devotion.
How can law take seriously that beliefs and practices not based in
commonly shared material-scientific fact animate the lives of
many of our fellow citizens?9
One goal in this Review is to examine whether Laborde’s LE
is a defensible approach to the role of religion in the liberal state.
At the same time, I will examine how well her approach fits with
the U.S. constitutional settlement regarding law and religion.
Although her book is not meant to be primarily an analysis of U.S.
law, Laborde relies on the work of important U.S. constitutional
scholars, who are seeking both a political theoretic and
constitutional answer to questions of nonestablishment and free
exercise. I will claim that a different kind of egalitarianism is the
better answer from both political theory and constitutional law:
an egalitarianism that does not disaggregate religion and
approach it similarly to other beliefs and practices, but rather that
takes seriously religion’s distinctiveness—its basis in one’s
8. See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND
RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 226 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S.
Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993)
[hereinafter Greene, Political Balance]. For other writings supporting religion as
distinctive, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING A MERICAN R ELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY
(2013); Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious Liberty Be Protected as Equality?, 85 TEX. L. R EV.
1185, 1211–15 (2007) (book review); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001–06 (1990);
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 316–19
(1996); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 3 (2000); Mark Storslee, On Religion’s Specialness, 81 REV. POL. 656, 661 (2019)
(responding to Laborde’s disaggregation argument) (“When it comes to religion, the
whole is more than the sum of its parts. And indeed, that might just be what makes it
special.”).
9. See Abner S. Greene, Religion and Theistic Faith: On Koppelman, Leiter, Secular
Purpose, and Accommodations, 49 TULSA L. R EV. 441 (2013) [hereinafter Greene, Theistic
Faith]. One of the issues debated in law and religion scholarship is how to define religion,
and whether belief in God is necessary to such definition. I have focused on belief in God—
on an extrahuman source of normative authority—as typical and at the core of the law and
religion debates in the U.S. Sometimes theory should be able to focus on typical examples,
rather than necessary features, of the matter under discussion. See FREDERICK SCHAUER,
THE FORCE OF LAW 35–41 (2015) (defending his focus on law’s coercive nature, even
though aspects of law are not coercive).
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relationship to God—and thus that treats religious people and
institutions as fully equal participants in our liberal democratic
project. I will also challenge a predicate to Laborde’s argument,
that the sovereign state in a liberal democracy has legitimate
authority to draw jurisdictional lines between church and state
and thus justifiably resolve the difficult establishment and free
exercise issues that arise. My objection to Laborde on this
question of authority isn’t that the state has no role in drawing
church-state lines, and isn’t that the state is never justified in so
doing; rather, my position is that there is no general argument that
backs the state in applying all laws to all persons and institutions.
We should see questions of political obligation (is there a moral
duty to obey the law?) and political legitimacy (is the state
justified in demanding our legal obedience?) as correlative; we
should appreciate that there is no valid, general, affirmative
answer to these questions; and thus, the state must earn its stripes,
as it were, law by law or case by case. This understanding of
political obligation and legitimacy undergirds one way of arguing
for exemptions. 10
Part I of this Review will describe Laborde’s argument. Part
II will offer two critiques of her position—that she is defending
the wrong kind of egalitarianism for the religion and state
settlement we have reached in the U.S. and that would be best for
any liberal democracy; and that her “jurisdictional” argument
backing the wholesale legitimacy of the liberal state’s role in
policing the religion-state settlement cannot be properly
sustained.
I. LABORDE’S CASE
Part I of Liberalism’s Religion (“Analogizing Religion”)
begins with a chapter containing LE’s response to three
challenges offered by the critical religion theorists. These
challenges are (a) semantic—that liberalism has not offered a
“stable, universally valid empirical referent for the category of
religion” (p. 18), (b) protestant—that “liberal law is based toward
individualistic, belief-based religions” (p. 21), and (c) realist—that
the liberal state’s treatment of religion is either “the naked
exercise of arbitrary power” (p. 24) and/or that it establishes
10. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
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liberalism as a kind of religion. Laborde’s answer to the semantic
challenge is centered in the anti-religious-distinctiveness position
taken by the LEs: The state may sometimes protect religious
belief and practice, but only because of qualities shared by secular
belief and practice; therefore, the LE needn’t get embroiled in
difficult questions of defining what is and isn’t “religion.” Her
answer to the protestant challenge is to reject the critical religion
theorists’ premise: In a properly functioning liberal democracy,
majoritarian power and prejudice isn’t reducible to a bias favoring
“belief-based, voluntarily chosen religious practices” (p. 33);
rather, law protects a “right not to be coerced into changing or
abandoning the beliefs or way of life that one in fact has,”
including both those who “choose” and those who are “called” (p.
34). As for the realist challenge, Laborde makes the easy point
that there are defensible and indefensible exercises of state
power. Of greater importance and connection to her LE position,
Laborde claims that LE “is not . . . grounded in any
comprehensive metaphysical, ontological, or ethical doctrine” (p.
40). Thus, although there’s no such thing as the state’s governing
in a value-free way, the critical religion theorists are wrong in
thinking the liberal state is establishing an official religion of
secularism (or anything else); rather, “liberalism is based on the
idea that all individuals should enjoy as much freedom as is
compatible with the freedoms of others” (p. 38). This follows from
Laborde’s discussion of classic Millian harm theory, and is not
meant to prefer the autonomous life over other ways of life.
The next two chapters of Part I describe possible approaches
to what in constitutional law we would call Free Exercise
Exemptions issues and Establishment Clause issues. Laborde sets
forth approaches from different liberal theorists, with some
support and some critique for each, all from her LE perspective
(which she then cashes out with an affirmative case in Part II).
Chapter 2 is about exemptions. Laborde begins with a description
and critique of what she calls “dissolving religion” (p. 44),
focusing on Ronald Dworkin’s take on exemptions in his final
work, Religion Without God. 11 On the one hand, Dworkin claims
freedom of religion is a general and not special right. This means
we shouldn’t apply elevated scrutiny to protect it; rather, the state
“must not appeal to the superiority of any way of life over
11. RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013).
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another” (p. 45), religious or otherwise. In this way, freedom of
religion is “an instantiation of a more general right of ethical
independence” (p. 46), and is an example of appropriate limits on
the state’s reasons for action. Carried to its extreme, this focus on
the government’s reasons, and not on possible disparate impact,
looks like Brian Barry’s no-holds-barred approach: If the state has
defensible reasons for a law of general applicability, then there’s
not a good case for exemptions. 12 But, as Laborde shows,
Dworkin was in fact concerned with laws that disparately affect
what a group might regard as “sacred” (p. 50)—although for
Dworkin this may be theistic or not theistic. This expanded view
of the sacred as religious leads to a potentially expansive view of
exemptions and to a view that forbids laws from being justified on
grounds that take positions on what counts as sacred. This in turn
requires some understanding of religious distinctiveness, even if
not limited to a God-centered understanding.
Laborde turns next to a view she dubs “mainstreaming
religion” (p. 50), covering a position advanced by Eisgruber and
Sager, which would protect religious interests comparably to
similarly serious nonreligious interests, against intentional or
unintentional state discrimination against vulnerable/minority
groups. 13 Exemptions are sometimes warranted, but not because
of anything distinctive about religious belief. In the U.S.
constitutional law community, Eisgruber and Sager are leaders in
the “religion as non-distinctive” school; they are LEs, so
Laborde’s critiques are internal to LEs. Her main point is that
Eisgruber and Sager “have not settled for a single criterion of
comparability between religion and nonreligion and instead
oscillate between normatively distinct criteria” (p. 54). One
criterion is “vulnerability to discrimination” (p. 54), about which
Laborde is mostly in agreement; the problem, though, is figuring
out which nonreligious commitments are ethically salient in the
way religious commitments are, so we can then analogize among
vulnerable groups and take steps toward awarding exemptions.
One comparator is “depth of commitments” (p. 55), and although
Laborde has some sympathy with this, she suggests we might
sometimes want to protect a deeply held religious interest that has
12. See BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF
MULTICULTURALISM (2001). For my response, see Abner S. Greene, Three Theories of
Religious Equality . . . and of Exemptions, 87 T EX. L. R EV. 963 (2009).
13. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 6.

GREENE 35:2

214

11/5/2020 10:16 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:207

no obvious nonreligious analogy. Finally, Laborde evaluates
Eisgruber and Sager’s focus on “close association” (p. 58) to
sometimes permit exemptions for groups; here, too, Laborde’s LE
approach is mostly sympathetic (e.g., a nonreligious as well as
religious group should be able to choose its leaders regardless of
a law of general applicability that would cover the normal
business world); one critique she offers is that religious
institutions sometimes might not properly qualify as truly close
associations (as, say, a family or small club would).
The third approach to exemptions that Laborde discusses
(and that she calls “narrowing religion” (p. 61)) is offered by
Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, in their book Secularism and
Freedom of Conscience. 14 Another LE offering, this book’s case
for exemptions would cover “moral beliefs [that] structure moral
identity” (p. 62), religious or nonreligious. Although Laborde
applauds Maclure and Taylor’s taking our ethical pluralism
seriously, she finds their focus on “categoricity” (p. 63)—on
whether the claim is based on an unalterable call of conscience—
too narrow. We might find religious practices of significance to a
claimant’s “moral integrity” (p. 66), without necessarily being
duties of conscience.
Chapter 3 of Liberalism’s Religion turns to the “state
neutrality puzzle” (p. 69), which in U.S. constitutional law is
Establishment Clause territory. Laborde once again gives us
theories from Dworkin and Eisgruber/Sager; the third effort here
comes from Jonathan Quong. All, again, are mostly fellow
travelers with Laborde; she is offering and tweaking versions of
LE, setting up her own case. Laborde reminds us of Dworkin’s
core argument for “ethical independence” (p. 70); the state should
be neutral about matters of religion as it should be neutral about
“the good in general” (p. 71). Dworkin is careful to limit this claim
to the state’s not using reasons based in foundational views of the
good life to regulate matters of personal ethics, such as religion,
family, and sexuality. Thus, “ethical independence does not
demand neutrality toward other kinds of goods—the good of
culture, the arts, or the environment, for example—because they
do not fall into [the] domain of personal ethics” (p. 76). But as in
much of the other liberal theory Laborde critiques, there’s a
14. JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE (2011).
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boundary problem; here the difficulty is in drawing the line
between when the state should not be involved because a matter
is one of “personal” (p. 80) ethics and when the matter might
affect social justice and possibly harm to others. (As always, the
core Millian notion of liberty until harm is caused requires a
theory of harm that may be sharply contested.) Laborde
concludes that “Dworkinian liberalism relies on a more
substantive view of the liberal good than he acknowledged” (p.
82).
On the nonestablishment side of things, Eisgruber and
Sager’s concern with vulnerable persons or groups—defined by
religion or otherwise—leads to a fairly capacious limit on state
speech, which Laborde dubs “civic disparagement” (p. 82). Not
only do they adopt a fairly mainstream view about the state’s not
endorsing a favored religion; they also contend the state may not
use its expressive powers in a way that would disparage persons
based on race or other vulnerable/minority characteristics.
Laborde is sympathetic to this “religion as not distinctive”
position, for theory and law. She reminds us that it can sometimes
be hard to tell, in the setting of public education (one arena for
state expression), whether the state is teaching a controverted and
potentially caste-creating view as true, versus teaching about
different positions in a complex area. She also notes that merely
because a matter is divisive or controversial doesn’t mean the
state’s taking a position is improper—Eisgruber and Sager’s
concern with which she agrees is about state endorsement of
favored positions on religion, race, and the like, which doubles as
state disparagement (sometimes clearly so, sometimes more
implicitly so) on these same grounds.
The third scholar whose views Laborde discusses as relevant
to establishment clause issues is Jonathan Quong, and his book
Liberalism Without Perfection. 15 Quong’s limit on state
justifications for lawmaking is based in what Laborde dubs a
theory of “foundational disagreement” (p. 92), and it requires
distinguishing disagreements about the good from disagreements
about the just. For Quong, the former are foundational and
appeal to “no premise that all citizens can reasonably expect to
share” (p. 93). He contends, though, that disagreements about the
just are not foundational, but rely on properly public debatable
15. JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION (2011).
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and resolvable positions. (Note that Quong’s is an anti-religiousdistinctiveness position; although it might include a case against
laws primarily backed by religious justification, his is a broader
Rawlsian public reason position.) Laborde’s key intervention is to
claim that the boundary between the realms of the just and the
good is often complex, “often requires drawing on contested ideas
about the good” (p. 104), and that “liberal neutrality lacks
resources to solve the boundary problem” (p. 107). 16 One might
think this is a victory for the critical religion theorists, but later in
the book Laborde resists this, defending the state’s legitimate
authority to determine where justice reigns and thus the state may
and must appropriately rule.
In Part II, Laborde develops her case for “disaggregating
religion,” at each turn reducing religion to aspects of religious
belief and practice that have secular analogues. In so doing,
Laborde shows that different dimensions of religion (and their
secular analogues) map onto different dimensions of “minimal
secularism” (p. 116) (for the Establishment Clause type issues)
and of “justice” (p. 197) (for the Free Exercise Clause type issues).
Chapter 4 disaggregates religion for nonestablishment issues;
Laborde defends what she dubs “minimal secularism” (p. 113).
Drawing in part on her Chapter 3 discussion of Dworkin,
Eisgruber and Sager, and Quong (and with references to John
Rawls at key points), Laborde develops three necessary principles
of minimal liberal secularism. These principles are about
accessible reasons backing law (“the justifiable state” (p. 117)),
the state’s refraining from disparaging vulnerable groups (“the
inclusive state” (p. 132)), and not grounding law in comprehensive
ethics/views of the good (“the limited state” (p. 143)). For each
principle, religion serves as just an example of how the state might
err. So, for the justifiable state, following Rawls’ public reason
theory, Laborde claims that “state-proffered reasons for laws
must be articulated in a language that members of the public can
understand and engage with” (p. 119). Accessible reasons are the
“currency of democratic debate” (p. 122). Religious reasons are
not always inaccessible in this way; and sometimes nonreligious
reasons can flunk the inaccessibility test (Laborde cites personal
16. For Quong’s response, see Jonathan Quong, On Laborde’s Liberalism, CRIM. L.
& PHIL., May 2019 (“All areas of social life are justice-apt.”) (“[D]isagreements between
reasonable citizens about the political status of certain creatures can be resolved by appeal
to the justificatory framework shared by all such citizens.”).
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experience as an example). Next, for the inclusive state, tracking
Eisgruber and Sager, Laborde claims that “[w]hen a social
identity is a marker of vulnerability and domination, it should not
be symbolically endorsed and promoted by the state” (p. 137).
Here, too, religion is just one example of how the state might fail
to adhere to this principle; and just as not all religious reasons are
inaccessible, so too not all state religious speech is impermissibly
disparaging. Finally, for the limited state, Laborde relies on a
Rawlsian principle (previewed in the earlier discussion of
Quong’s work), claiming that “[w]hen a practice relates to
comprehensive ethics [(otherwise described as “comprehensive
conception[s] of the good” (p. 145))], it should not be coercively
enforced on individuals” (p. 144). This may cover nonreligious as
well as religious doctrines; and when either religion or nonreligion
is used in a noncomprehensive way, it is permissible. So, to
summarize what Laborde is up to in Chapter 4: The state must
turn square corners on all three metrics—laws must be based in
accessible reasons; the state should not speak in a way that
disparages vulnerable groups; and laws may not be based in
comprehensive views of the good. State action regarding religious
or secular beliefs and practices is problematic if it flunks any of
the three metrics; if it satisfies all three criteria, then it is not
problematic.
In Chapter 5, Laborde again treats religion as non-distinctive
in developing a theory of freedom of association (for groups).
Actually that’s the second part of Chapter 5; the first part is an
important and to some extent stand-alone argument—it’s
Laborde’s predicate for the whole book, where she defends the
legitimacy of the liberal democratic state’s authority to be
deciding issues of law and religion in the first place. I’ll return to
that after describing the freedom of association argument and the
exemptions argument from Chapter 6. To gain presumptive
freedom of association a group must be voluntary (members may
leave “at no excessive cost” (p. 174)) and identificatory
(“individuals join to pursue a conception of the good that is
central to their identity and integrity” (p. 174)). With these
preliminaries in place, Laborde claims that groups—religious or
nonreligious—may have either “coherence interests” or
“competence interests” (p. 175). The former tracks what in U.S.
constitutional law is a right of expressive association—to form a
group to advance particular messages or interests, and thus to
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exclude those who don’t share that common purpose. Laborde
sets forth some conditions for groups to claim freedom of
association in this way—their professed doctrine must clearly be
restrictive regarding membership; there should be formal
organization; and there should be individual freedom to enter and
exit. When a group meets these criteria, “full exemptions from
laws of general application” (p. 175) are warranted. The key issues
here are selection and exclusion of leaders and members.
Competence interests are a bit trickier to grasp. Laborde says they
“refer to associations’ special expertise in the interpretation and
application of [a group’s professed] standards, purposes, and
commitments” (pp. 190–191). In such settings—again, religious or
otherwise—courts must exhibit sufficient deference to the group’s
expertise and ability to answer what we might think of as internal
questions (e.g., a question of religious truth or a question of who
deserves tenure or promotion).
Laborde bases her theory of non-religion-distinctive
exemptions, in Chapter 6, on the notion of integrity. “Integrity is
an ideal of congruence between one’s ethical commitments and
one’s actions” (p. 203). It is about “the values of identity,
autonomy, moral agency, and self-respect” (p. 204). Based on this
conception, Laborde contends that the state has reason to exempt
“integrity-protecting commitments” (p. 203) (IPCs), of which
there are two varieties—“obligation IPCs” (p. 215), which need
not be connected to a narrow view of conscience (they can be, e.g.,
based in “[c]ultural or communal practices” (p. 215)), and
“identity
IPCs,”
which
are
“non-obligation-imposing
commitments and practices that comprehensively regulate the
lives of the claimant” (p. 216). Laborde then develops the
following architecture for courts to consider exemptions claims:
Judges may examine a claimant’s sincerity; the practice claimed
for an exemption must be nontrivial, important; “morally
abhorrent claims” (p. 207) should be rejected at the get-go;
“morally ambivalent claims” (p. 209) can pass step one and get to
a balancing test at step two. 17 In general, exemptions claims are
17. A few commentators on Laborde’s book have taken her to task for allowing too
many claims into the “morally ambivalent” category and thus subject to a balancing test.
See, e.g., Alan Patten, Religious Accommodation and Disproportionate Burden, CRIM. L.
& PHIL., Jan. 2020 (“[A] person has a pro tanto claim on others only for a fair opportunity
to pursue and fulfill her IPCs. There is no pro tanto claim to realize IPCs that either by
their very nature are inconsistent with the fair claims of others, or that for contingent
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tricky because they represent a conflict between the state’s view
of the good and the claimant’s/group’s view. In a properly
functioning liberal democracy, we might want people to take
responsibility for their beliefs (and obey the law or risk the
sanction), but “only if background circumstances are fair” (p. 220).
Laborde then develops two methods for determining when such
circumstances may be sufficiently unfair as to warrant an
exemption—“disproportionate burden” (p. 221), which mostly
covers obligation IPCs, and “majority bias” (p. 229), which mostly
covers identity IPCs.
Judges applying Laborde’s disproportionate burden test
would examine several factors: “directness” of the burden (p.
221), “severity” of the burden (p. 222), proportionality of the
burden considering the aim of the law (p. 225), and whether the
exemption can be awarded without excessive cost-shifting (p.
227). “[E]xemptions are compatible with justice if the balance of
these four reasons renders the burden [on the claimant]
disproportionate” (p. 228). The majority bias test focuses on
situations in which the majority protects its own interests but fails
to similarly protect minorities (of various sorts). A key concern is
if such bias affects “[c]ore societal opportunities [such as] access
to primary goods, work, and education” (p. 231).
Finally, I turn to Laborde’s treatment of “state sovereignty
reasons (resource scarcity, etc.) are incompatible with the fair claims of others.”); Lori
Watson, Integrity: An Individual or Social Virtue?, 81 REV. POL. 652, 654–55 (2019)
(“[C]laims for refusing to recognize or act on the basis of laws that demand equal
recognition for others will not ground an integrity objection.”). But as Laborde has said in
response to some commentators, hers is a modest liberalism that is a “substantive
commitment that takes seriously pluralism and the burdens of judgment.” Cécile Laborde,
Reply: Disagreement, Equal Respect, and the Boundaries of Liberalism, 81 REV. POL. 665,
666 (2019). She adds (responding to Watson) that the disagreement between relational
egalitarians and orthodox political liberals is a “reasonable disagreement about liberal
justice,” and that sometimes granting exemptions is one way to recognize this
disagreement. Id. at 667.
I would go further than Laborde and suggest that an exemptions regime should be
and, in fact, always is, a balancing test. When we exclude certain claims supposedly up
front, as “morally abhorrent,” we are implicitly doing a kind of balancing—it’s just that the
case is so heavily tilted toward denying the exemption that it looks as though we’ve done
something at step one without reaching a step two balancing test. Here, as in free speech
law, it’s better not to bury any of the normative work we’re doing. Rather, in both settings,
we should acknowledge a wide array of claims for religious freedom or freedom of speech,
and then realize that some of these claims are quite weak, either on their own merits, or
because of strong countervailing state interests, or both. For more on this in the free speech
setting, see Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U.
L. REV. 1475, 1508–11 (2018) [hereinafter Greene, Constitutional Right].
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and religious institutionalism” (p. 161). This is a predicate for the
rest of her LE argument, as it purports to ground the state’s role
in resolving difficult questions of establishment and free exercise.
Earlier in the book, Laborde suggests that one of the challenges
to LE posed by the critical religion theorists is that of
“jurisdictional boundary” (p. 5), and she agrees that “liberals must
think harder about the ultimate sovereignty of the state and its
legitimacy in enforcing specific terms of liberal justice” (p. 6). In
Chapter 5, Laborde rejects this challenge with a ringing
endorsement of the legitimacy of the liberal democratic state in
using coercive power to resolve various boundary questions and
then the difficult as-applied questions that arise in the day-to-day
operations of the state. We need, says Laborde, a “final, ultimate
source of sovereignty” (p. 161) to resolve various conflicts. The
state has liberal legitimacy for this task if it “pursues a
recognizably liberal conception of justice, and does so
democratically” (p. 168). It is the “only institution with the
legitimacy to [resolve matters on which there is reasonable
disagreement], because it can reliably enforce a scheme of
cooperation over time, and because it represents the interests of
citizens as citizens” (p. 168). Thus, the state has the legitimate
“competence to adjudicate jurisdictional boundary questions” (p.
162), including proper lines of church/state, religious/secular,
political/personal, and public/private. Laborde’s is a familiar
argument for the legitimacy of a liberal state’s coercive power,
focusing on such a state’s democratic underpinning and the
systemic need for settlement.
II. TWO CRITIQUES OF LABORDE’S CASE
A. AN OPPOSING VIEW—RELIGION AS DISTINCTIVE
Liberalism’s Religion focuses on the liberal egalitarian
position—both Laborde’s and other scholars whose related views
she connects to her own. She briefly describes a “separationist
approach” (p. 29) that sees religion as special, but spends little
time on it. In Part II.A.1, I will attempt to fill that gap, presenting
a normative and doctrinal case for religion as distinctive in a
liberal democratic state, specifically in the setting of the U.S.
Constitution. In Part II.A.2, I will show where Laborde’s
“disaggregating” approach fails to fit with the religion-asdistinctive approach, while agreeing with her at times that it is
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appropriate to fold aspects of religion into larger categories.
1. The case for seeing religion as distinctive
At least for the U.S. Constitution, and more broadly for any
liberal democratic state, we should see religious belief and
practice as distinctive in certain ways. Most issues of religious
freedom in the U.S.—under both religion clauses—are connected
to theistic belief, to belief in an extrahuman source of normative
authority (and sometimes generative power). Several important
religion law scholars over the last generation have developed a
Laborde-like LE approach, deflecting from the central role faith
in God plays in the lives of devout religious people, instead
folding religion into larger categories of belief and practice, thus
backgrounding the fact that the First Amendment makes religion
the subject of nonestablishment and free exercise norms. These
approaches do not take seriously enough the primacy of God’s
commands for devout religious people. Even if such people are
not theocrats, and acknowledge that God’s commands will
sometimes have to yield to those of the state, nonetheless they
deem the call from an extrahuman source of normative authority
to be distinctive. Belief in God, for devout religious people, is not
comparable to anything. 18
The liberal democratic state was born in part from a desire to
have a secular rather than theistic grounding for government.
Along with this came strong arguments for broad toleration of
religious faiths. This is a commendable version of political
pluralism, accepting the various sources of the good and authority
to which many of our fellow citizens adhere. Although later in this
Review I summarize a non-religion-distinctive version of political
pluralism in a liberal democracy, there is a case for focusing
specially on theistic belief. Reliance on an extrahuman source of
normative authority is not like relying on intrahuman theories of
the good; often, a sectarian theistic view will appeal and speak to,
and only be accessible to, those who share the relevant religious
faith. “What is inaccessible to nonbelievers . . . is . . . the
relationship between the human believer and the extrahuman

18. For my challenge to several scholars who critique a God-centered view of
religious freedom, see Greene, Theistic Faith, supra note 9 (discussing works by Richard
Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Brian Leiter).
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source of authority.”19 There is, thus, a distinctive reason to keep
the state out of advancing or endorsing sectarian theistic norms,
in various aspects of statecraft (including, as I will canvass further
below, in the lawmaking process, public schools, and state
speech). There is similarly a distinctive reason to grant
exemptions from laws of general applicability to our fellow
citizens who pledge allegiance to such an extrahuman source of
normative authority (with appropriate consideration for the good
advanced by uniform application of such law).
A question for liberal political theory that overlaps with a
question for domestic constitutional theory is what kind of legal
nonestablishment and free exercise rules should apply if we are
appropriately agnostic, as a matter of political/constitutional
theory, on the question of whether God exists. If we take
liberalism to be a departure from state-sponsored religion, and
based in a broad (though not unlimited) toleration of various
religious beliefs and practices, then political agnosticism on the
God question is the right fit. Were we to bake either theism or
atheism into constitutional and other legal rules, we would
improperly take positions on a question that not only divides
people in a deep way, but also that is arguably the key question
on which the modern liberal state has developed to avoid taking
a firm position. Furthermore, one of the beauties of the U.S.
constitutional system—regarding both structure and rights—is
that it is agnostic at its core, in the following sense: 20 In devising
both separation of powers and federalism, the framers were
primarily concerned with avoiding concentration of power in any
one branch or person or seat of government. This is a kind of
structural agnosticism, making it hard for any answer to be firmly
deemed correct, at least not without clearing difficult hurdles and
not without opportunity for challenge and revision. And our core
19. Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REV. 535, 538 (1994). Laws based in natural and social science are not similarly
inaccessible to nonbelievers. “[E]ven if science . . . is based—as religion is—in an
important way on faith (nondeducible premises), the critical difference is that by its own
terms, science points to the human and natural world for the source of value, whereas
religion, by its own terms, points not only to the human and natural world, but also outward
to an extrahuman realm.” Id. at 540.
20. For elaboration on this “multiple repositories of power” theory, see Abner S.
Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. C HI. L. REV. 123
(1994); Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 477 (2000); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
COLUM. L. R EV. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Greene, Kiryas Joel].
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political rights—of speech, press, assembly, petition, and voting—
are best understood as offering citizens robust opportunities to
challenge the status quo. My claim is that liberal theory and
constitutional law back an open-ended political agnosticism on
the question whether God exists. To that end, U.S. constitutional
doctrine has often reached a workable resolution by appreciating
the special role God plays in the lives of the devoutly religious,
while keeping the state out of advancing specific religious
positions.
Here’s how the religion as distinctive position has played out
at the Supreme Court, from its apex with Justice Brennan as the
key figure, to some decline since. Let’s start with the
Establishment Clause, and examine four types of problem. First,
consider the understanding that law should not be based in
express, predominant, religious justification. This norm applies to
legislators, not citizens. One way of understanding this is as a
political process point—reliance on an extrahuman source of
normative authority, in whom only some of our citizens (and
legislators) believe, cuts out others from meaningful access to the
basis of the resulting general, binding law. 21 The Court has
invalidated state action on this “religious purpose” test in
Epperson, Wallace, Edwards, Santa Fe, and McCreary. 22 Although
some scholars and Justices have questioned it—primarily
proposing an alternative test that would uphold any law with a
plausible secular justification, regardless of an actual express,
predominant, religious justification—this line of cases has held
fast. They are a prime example of the religion as distinctive
position, for there is no comparable norm against laws based in
express, predominant, secular justification.
Second, in the public school system, the state may not teach
religious doctrine, and its teachers and other officials may not lead
students in religious prayer (even if students may formally opt

21. This is not to deny the deep influence of religion and religious ideas on secular
law. For a recent thoughtful exposition of this, see Jeremy Waldron, Religion’s Liberalism,
CRIM. L. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2020) (explaining that religious ideas that “can be
discerned in liberalism’s abstract philosophical positions” include the sacredness of the
person, human dignity, free will, personal responsibility, equality, respect for ordinary
people, rights, and social justice).
22. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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out). 23 That religion is distinctive for both points should be
apparent—the state teaches secular doctrine as true all the time
(various views on U.S. history, science, etc.); and teachers and
other officials may lead students in nonreligious recitation (even
if students may formally opt out). 24
Third, the cases involving public funding of private, religious
schools are complex in terms of whether religion is treated as
distinctive. The core line of Establishment Clause cases now
permits state funding (through various mechanisms) that benefits
private religious schooling, so long as such funding is general (it’s
not just for such schools) and parents have a choice whether to
send their kids to various schools, private religious just one option
among them. 25 The Court has mostly backed away from an earlier
view that we should see religion as distinctive and disallow
funding that benefits private religious education. Note, though,
that state funds may not be earmarked for teaching religion as
such; that would violate the Establishment Clause just as teaching
religious doctrine in public schools would. Also, doctrine still
allows some “play in the joints,” i.e., still allows the state to
sometimes treat religion as distinctive in not including religious
schooling among other generally available funding, even if the
Establishment Clause would permit such inclusion. The key
holding is Locke v. Davey, 26 permitting Washington to forbid
otherwise generally available funding for post-secondary
education from being used for ministerial studies. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion treats religion as distinctive, explaining how
the framers had a particular concern with public funding for
religious ministers, with no similar concern about public funding
for other professions or studies. The Court distinguished Locke in
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 27 holding that the Free
Exercise Clause forbids excluding religious institutions from
receiving public support for building children’s playgrounds;
there was no good reason to treat the religious recipient as
23. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106–07, and Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589–94, are clear on the
former; Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962), on the latter.
24. See Aaron Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FIU L. REV. 765, 767–77
(2019). For some doctrinal difficulties with this position, see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge
of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. R EV. 451 (1995).
25. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
26. 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004).
27. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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distinctively unworthy of such funds. In Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue, the Court extended Trinity Lutheran to
public funding of private education, while reaffirming Locke as a
narrow holding. 28 If the state funds private secular education
generally, it may not refuse to similarly fund private religious
education generally; in this setting, says the Court, there is no
“play in the joints” for the state to account for disestablishment
concerns if there is no actual Establishment Clause problem.
Fourth, government sponsorship of religious symbols is
another area in which religion is distinctive. The Court has
refused to adopt one of two possible black-letter rules—the state
may never sponsor a religious symbol, or it always may do so (so
long as the symbol doesn’t operate in coercive fashion, which will
almost never be the case). Rather, the Court has examined
nuanced contextual factors to determine whether the state
appears to be endorsing a preferred religion through the symbol,
or whether the religiosity of the symbol is better seen as
backgrounded against a broader secular meaning. So if a crèche
stands alone atop courthouse steps, it is unconstitutional; but if it
is part of a broader holiday display, it’s okay. 29 If the Ten
Commandments are displayed on a courthouse wall, that’s a
problem; but if they’re part of a monument park on state grounds,
that’s okay. 30 Even a 32-foot-high Latin cross on state land may
be constitutional if it is best understood as honoring the World
War I dead, and not as the state’s promoting Christianity. 31 None
of this contextual examination is needed when the state erects a
secular symbol, such as the U.S. flag.
We may deduce one more principle from these religion-asdistinctive Establishment Clause areas of law—the state may
advance various notions of the good, even hotly contested ones,
so long as they are secular and not expressly those of specific

28. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 WL 3518364, at *11
(U.S. June 30, 2020) (“A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State
decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are
religious.”).
29. Compare Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), with
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. Compare McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844 (2005),
with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
31. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
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religions or religion in general. 32 There is an important alternative
view here, based in a robust Rawlsian conception of public reason,
that would bar the state from advancing any comprehensive
notion of the good, religious or secular. I’ll return to that—and
challenge it—in the next section, when I discuss how Laborde’s
view fits with that broader, religion-as-not-distinctive position.
On the Free Exercise Clause side of the ledger, the easiest
rule is that the state may not discriminate against particular
religions. The Court was unanimous, for example, in spotting such
discrimination against a small religion in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 33 This norm is not distinctive
to religion, in the following sense—our Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence would reach the same result, but it would also reach
this result for targeted discrimination against a specific race, or
gender, or sexual orientation. What counts as invalid state
discrimination against religion generally has proven to be
complex terrain. An easy case was McDaniel v. Paty, 34
invalidating a state constitutional provision forbidding religious
clergy from running for certain state offices. Locke/Trinity
Lutheran/Espinoza explore a harder aspect of this (denial of
otherwise generally available funds to religious persons or
institutions). Although I need to think about the issue in more
detail, my current view is that while Trinity Lutheran was
correctly decided, Espinoza is a mistake. 35 The Missouri program
in Trinity Lutheran involved state funds for nonprofits to
rubberize playground surfaces. This is a purely secular use, the
Establishment Clause does not bar religious institutions from
receiving such funds, and there is no good disestablishment value
in denying such funds to religious institutions. Thus, we can

32. For my support for a broad view of secular state speech, see Abner S. Greene,
Government Endorsement: A Reply to Nelson Tebbe’s Government Nonendorsement, 98
MINN. L. R EV. HEADNOTES 87 (2013); Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000); Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69
FORDHAM L. R EV. 1667 (2001); Abner S. Greene, State Speech and Political Liberalism,
28 CONST. COMM. 421 (2013).
33. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
34. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
35. I put to one side the anti-Catholic discriminatory animus that might have been
instrumental in producing the relevant “no religious aid” provisions of the Missouri and
Montana constitutions in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza. See Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t
of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 WL 3518364 (U.S. June 30, 2020) (Alito, J., concurring).
Discriminatory animus should be relevant and sometimes dispositive in invalidating state
action.
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properly see Missouri’s “no state aid to religious institutions” rule
as improperly discriminatory in this setting. On the other hand, a
state does have a valid disestablishment-based reason to deny
public funding for religious education: even if including religious
schools as ultimate beneficiaries of state funds does not violate
the Establishment Clause, in large part because of the
evenhandedness of such funding, a state may legitimately wish to
advance secular education with its funds, in both public and
private schools, leaving religious education to be funded
privately. 36 Generally speaking, the Court allows more leeway for
differential government funding (and certainly for government
speech) than for differential government regulation, so long as
there is a legitimate public policy reason to be funding program X
and not program Y. I realize that everything in this analysis turns
on what counts as a legitimate versus illegitimate public policy
reason; the argument I would need to develop in greater detail is
why a strict public-private line regarding funding of religious
education is at least a plausible, valid, state interest, even if the
state is not required to adhere to that line. In sum, the position I
am sketching here is that public funding of education is an area in
which a state should be able to treat religion as distinctive if it
wishes, and that the Court has erred in not recognizing that.
The big action in Free Exercise Clause constitutional and
statutory law has been the question of exemptions—when, if ever,
should religious persons or institutions receive an exemption from
an otherwise valid law of general applicability? The question can
be stated in two steps: (i) Does the Free Exercise Clause ever
require such exemptions (and if so, should courts award them as
well as legislatures)? (ii) If the Free Exercise Clause does not
require such exemptions (either at all or in particular cases), what
is the appropriate legislative role in awarding them as a matter of
policy (often called accommodations), and are there
Establishment Clause limits on such legislative power? From 1963
to 1990, the Court had reached a kind of settlement on (i): The
36. I am focusing on how the relevant funds are used—for rubberizing playground
surfaces versus for scholarship tuition for schooling. Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the
Court in Espinoza proceeds differently—it says the relevant state constitutional provisions
in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza discriminate based on the religious status of the ultimate
funds recipient. See id. at *6–7. Justice Gorsuch in concurrence and Justice Breyer in
dissent find fault in Roberts’ analysis—both think it more accurate to say that what is at
issue in these cases is how the funds are used. See id. at *21–22 (Gorsuch, J., concurring);
id. at *27–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption from a law that
places a substantial burden on religious practice, unless the
government can satisfy strict scrutiny—i.e., that the law satisfies a
compelling state interest and that denying an exemption is a
narrowly tailored means of achieving that interest. This was a
period during which the Court treated burdens on religious
practice as distinctive. The Court ruled against the state in four
unemployment insurance cases applying this test, where claimants
had been denied such insurance after refusing work on religious
grounds. 37 And the Court ruled against the state in one other case
applying this test, Wisconsin v. Yoder, allowing the Amish to pull
fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children out of any schooling,
public or private, contra state law requiring otherwise. 38
Otherwise the Court ruled for the government, and perhaps it’s
best to see the practice over these years as applying elevated but
not really strict scrutiny; nonetheless, burdens on religious
practice were treated with special judicial attention. But in 1990,
the Court shifted gears and held in Employment Division v.
Smith 39 that even when laws of general applicability place
substantial burdens on religious practice, only rational basis
scrutiny is required. The concerns were of two sorts—one, that it’s
too hard for courts to balance state interest versus religious
interest on a case-by-case basis; two, that requiring exemptions
for religious claimants (even after a balancing test) would lead to
a kind of anarchy. These concerns aren’t specific to religion (the
Court wouldn’t have required exemptions for nonreligious
persons either); but the Court’s refusal to see harm to religious
practice as requiring special treatment was a significant step away
from the religion-as-distinctive approach.
And thus, we turn to step (ii): In the aftermath of Smith,
Congress and several state governments enacted laws requiring
courts to award exemptions to religious claimants substantially
burdened by laws of general applicability, unless the government
37. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Some argue that these are not best
seen as exemptions cases, but rather as holdings preventing states from discriminating
against religious reasons for not working. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence
G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting
Religious Conduct, 61 U. C HI. L. REV. 1245, 1277–82 (1994).
38. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
39. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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can persuade the court that uniform application of the law is
needed to achieve a compelling state interest. In City of Boerne v.
Flores, 40 the Court declared the federal version of such a law—the
Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act
(“RFRA”)41—
unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments, but
RFRA remains good law restricting the federal government. The
federal RFRA, and state versions, are religion-as-distinctive
laws—under them, substantial burdens on religious practice
deserve amelioration in a way unmatched by similar burdens on
nonreligious practice. The Court has so far been receptive to this
approach; 42 in particular, any Establishment Clause objection to
such distinctive exemptions for religion has not proven
problematic. Courts are still working through a complex issue—
to what extent does the Establishment Clause require accounting
for harm to third parties in balancing state interest against the
interest of a religious exemption claimant (assuming the strict
scrutiny inquiries about compelling state interest and narrow
tailoring invite a kind of judicial balancing)?43
Not long after the Court decided Smith, I criticized that
decision, trumpeting the religion-as-distinctive settlement that
had been in place. 44 My Free Exercise Clause argument was of a
political participation legitimacy sort—if we exclude religious
claims as express, predominant, justification for law, then we owe
something to religious people (one cannot be fully bound by law
where the lawmaking process excludes some of what one believes
to be true), and a scheme of exemptions (with proper balancing)
follows. 45 A softer version of my “compensation” argument can
40. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West).
42. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (construing related statutes).
43. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion).
44. See Greene, Political Balance, supra note 8.
45. For some of my responses to objections, see id. at 1636–39. Laborde objects to
my political balance argument in two ways: She reiterates her LE, disaggregation
approach, separating why we might sometimes protect religious practice from why we
might sometimes exclude it from backing lawmaking; and she rejects “the view that people
should be compensated for the illegitimacy of some of the arguments they might present
when acting in official capacity” (p. 304 n.90). My baseline differs from hers—mine is that
all citizens have an equal right (through their legislators) to speak their truth in the
lawmaking process; a partial gag rule on such speech creates a legitimacy problem for the
resulting law that purports to bind all, including those whose arguments were excluded
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be made—we have struck a good political balance of keeping
religion out of politics and politics out of religion (or should be
doing so, with various adjustments and balancings). A deep
constitutional commitment to religious freedom requires both a
governmental sector free from sectarian doctrinal religious claims
and protection for people to live by their religious faiths to the
greatest extent possible with the equal freedom of others. This is
an argument for a distinctive role for religious exemptions, which
doesn’t have a counterpart for nonreligious claims, because we
permit nonreligious arguments to be the express, predominant,
justification for law, we permit the state to lead students in secular
recitation and teach core secular values in public schools, and we
permit the state symbolically to advance the truth of nonreligious
positions, such as by flying the American flag.
2. How Laborde’s “disaggregating religion” approach fits and
doesn’t fit with the religion as distinctive approach
Recall Laborde’s central LE claim: “religion is not uniquely
special: whatever treatment it receives from the law, it receives in
virtue of features that it shares with nonreligious beliefs,
conceptions, and identities” (p. 3). Everything she says about
what the state may not do (nonestablishment) and what it must
do (free exercise exemptions) she says through the prism of her
claim that liberalism’s religion is not about what makes religion
distinctive, but rather about what makes religion like other things.
In the preceding section, I argued from a normative and
descriptive perspective that liberal (and constitutional) theory can
and should treat religion as distinctive. I now set forth several
ways in which Laborde’s religion-as-not-distinctive approach
from being the express, predominant, justification for law. That there might be a good
reason for the partial gag rule (on which Laborde and I agree) does not make this
legitimacy problem go away.
In other words, we should distinguish two types of argument we might exclude from
being the express, predominant ground for lawmaking. We have reached a justifiable
settlement to exclude certain such grounds—e.g., racism or sexism. This is a kind of
viewpoint exclusion for lawmaking. When we exclude a sectarian theistic claim from
grounding lawmaking it isn’t because we have determined the viewpoint contained therein
is wrong or otherwise unjustifiable. Rather, the state should take no position on contested
religious truth claims, and, similarly, such claims should not be the express, predominant
ground for generally binding law—such reliance on an extrahuman source of normative
authority improperly excludes nonbelievers from the lawmaking process. But this does not
mean the religious viewpoint asserted for lawmaking is illegitimate in the way a racist or
sexist viewpoint is.
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conflicts with what I have claimed is the better view, and a few
ways in which Laborde and I share common ground.
First, regarding nonestablishment, Laborde’s three principles
are that the state should base coercive laws on accessible reasons,
that the state should not endorse social identities when the upshot
would be to harm vulnerable minority groups, and that the state
should not base coercive law on comprehensive ethics, i.e.,
notions of the good. She means these principles to include religion
as an example of the problem, but, since she has disaggregated
religion into (what she claims are) its features, her claims at each
turn are broader. I share her concern about accessibility but
would limit its application in a way she does not; I mostly agree
with her about state nonendorsement of powerful over vulnerable
groups; and I mostly disagree with the concern about basing law
on comprehensive notions of the good. The normative and
descriptive theory I sketched in the prior section requires a
powerful but narrow set of limits on state action regarding
nonestablishment.
Laborde bases her theory of accessible reasons backing
coercive law on a principle of democratic political participation,
and, I would add, democratic legitimacy (and Laborde calls this
principle “the justifiable state” (p. 117)). In the liberal state,
legislators are representatives of and fiduciaries for the sovereign
citizens; the currency of legislative deliberation should be based
in reasons and justifications that all citizens, as citizens (rather
than as, say, members of the dominant religious group), can
follow and appreciate. This is properly seen as a burden on
lawmakers; citizens as such may debate each other based on any
kind of reason. Basing coercive legislation on express,
predominant reference to an extrahuman source of normative
authority—the majority’s understanding of God’s will—renders
the resulting legislation illegitimate as to those who don’t share
the relevant religious faith, because they (through legislators who
would be able to speak for them) lack access to the justificatory
grounding for the law. Laborde refers to this use of Rawlsian
public reason theory as a “thin epistemic filter” (p. 119), and that
seems right. As part of her LE, disaggregating religion approach,
Laborde claims that “religious views . . . are not uniquely special
from the point of view of accessibility” (p. 125). Her examples are
“personal testimony” and “personal experience” (pp. 125–126).
But these are unlikely candidates for the type of
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reason/justification that could expressly and predominantly
capture a legislative body and lead to coercive law. It seems like a
way of saying “see, religion really isn’t distinctive, we can be LEs
here!” It distracts from the core animating concern about
inaccessible reasons backing legislative action—religious ones.
Moreover, the disaggregation approach fails to grapple with what
religious people hold nearest and dearest to their hearts, minds,
and souls—their faith in and relationship to an extrahuman source
of normative authority, i.e., to God. The point isn’t that religious
reference is always obscure or not based in reason; this is a
complex issue, because for some religious people, God’s-willbased arguments are no less based in reason than are other
arguments. The point is that the source of authority is outside the
state’s legal apparatus—the framers of the Constitution and laws
or those documents—and instead based in the eternal omnipotent
framer and draftsperson, as it were. There is a unique problem
with basing law on that kind of referent, and acknowledging that
uniqueness allows us to focus on distinctive ways in which the
liberal state should treat religious belief—regarding both
limitations on and exemptions from lawmaking.
Laborde’s second nonestablishment principle is about the
“inclusive state” (p. 132); it rejects government speech that would
exalt some social identities over others. Although this notion of
nonendorsement is closely tied to the similar idea Justice
O’Connor developed in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 46
Laborde follows Eisgruber and Sager (and other scholars such as
Nelson Tebbe), 47 in applying this norm to any social identity that
“is a marker of vulnerability and domination,” which could
include “race, . . . culture or ethnic identity” (p. 137). A culturalspecific, context-dependent, objective inquiry is needed to
determine where and how state speech runs afoul of this norm. As
a matter of proper liberal democratic theory—focusing on equal
liberty—and of U.S. constitutional law, the extension of this norm
beyond religion seems appropriate. Our Equal Protection Clause
is properly understood as blocking symbolic state action that
disparages persons on the basis of religion, race, or similar
dominant-over-vulnerable social markers. Religion should not be
seen as distinctive on this score, and we can ground the norm
46. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
47. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 6; Nelson Tebbe, Government
Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 658–65 (2013).
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solely in the Equal Protection Clause. So, a state’s placing a crèche
atop its courthouse steps, or placing a symbol of white nationalism
in the same spot, are equally unconstitutional examples of
government speech (although I don’t mean to claim they have
equal moral status; the former is a symbol to be welcomed when
placed by private persons or churches on their own property; the
latter is a symbol to be condemned even when placed by private
persons on private property, though, under U.S. free speech law,
with some exceptions, it is permitted).
Laborde’s third nonestablishment principle—“the limited
state” (p. 143)—forbids state coercive action based on a
“comprehensive conception of the good,” religious or otherwise
(p. 145). This Rawlsian idea, previewed in Laborde’s analysis of
Quong’s work, highlights the libertarian aspect of liberalism, in
the following sense: it “prioritizes individual rights of selfdetermination in ethical matters” (p. 144). As a threshold
question of proper grounds for state action, this principle is overly
restrictive. Say the majority in a legislature are vitalists, and
believe that state action should be predicated on preserving
human life above all else. Or say they are staunchly committed to
environmental stewardship, and believe that all state action
should start from that premise. 48 One can imagine many other
examples, including majorities that are in the grips of a particular
political and/or economic theorist (Karl Marx, Adam Smith,
Milton Friedman, etc.). A state may have a comprehensive view
about the good (Laborde uses ethics and the good
interchangeably here) rather than a piecemeal view about the
good, and, as a step-one, threshold, presumptive matter of proper
grounding for state action, there is nothing about liberalism that
prevents the state from acting according to one or another
comprehensive view, such as the examples I have mentioned.
Whether a proper constitution in a liberal democracy should
contain rights that trump state action (and the content of such
rights) is a separate, second-step question. Some state-backed
comprehensive notions of the good may never infringe
constitutional rights; some may do so all of the time; and some
may do so on a case-by-case basis. Thus, my response to Laborde’s
religion-is-not-distinctive approach here is twofold: First, even
lumping religion with other comprehensive notions of the good,
48. See Greene, Constitutional Right, supra note 17, at 1520–21.
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the “limited state” principle is too limited. Second, we should
treat religion as distinctive regarding proper grounds for coercive
law, but that requires cycling back to principle one, regarding the
justifiable state and accessibility.
Regarding exemptions, Laborde and I share a commitment
to a fairly robust scheme that would require multi-factor, case-bycase, balancing. 49 I have developed two separate arguments for
such a scheme—one that is internal to U.S. constitutional religion
clause jurisprudence; the other that is not distinctive to religion,
but based in a different theoretical predicate for why robust
exemptions are appropriate for a liberal democracy. Regarding
the former, as I have explained above, because the state is
precluded from basing law on express, predominant, religious
justification, from teaching the truth of a religion in public school
(or more generally), from leading public school students in
religious prayer, and from using its speech power to endorse a
favored religion, it is also proper to let religious people out from
under the clutches of law that substantially burdens their religious
practice, that puts them in a deep conflict between the state and
God. This is a strong public-private line settlement, one that we
have come close to achieving at times in our constitutional (and
statutory) jurisprudence. The case for exemptions here is
distinctive to religion. I turn to the case for exemptions more
broadly in the next section.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE PREDICATE FOR EXEMPTIONS
Although it appears in Chapter 5, Laborde’s case for the
legitimacy of the liberal state’s coercive authority, for its
justifiable “competence to adjudicate jurisdictional boundary
questions” (p. 162), is a predicate for the book. She contends that
we are faced with “circumstances of reasonable disagreement” (p.
168), and only the state has the legitimacy to impose and enforce
solutions. Laborde’s argument in this section is telescoped, and
she does not claim to be setting forth the full case. Furthermore,
her argument for state sovereignty isn’t necessary for the central
49. A certain subset of exemptions problems poses a particularly difficult challenge
for me, namely, those that pit certain equality claims—say, to reproductive freedom or to
LGBTQ rights—against claims for religious exemption. Laborde acknowledges that in
many of these types of cases, the religious person is not making a morally abhorrent claim,
but rather a morally ambivalent one, and thus a balancing test is needed (pp. 225–27). How
we should conduct such a balancing test is one of the issues in a work-in-progress of mine,
tentatively called “The Dilemma of Liberal Pluralism.”
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claim in the book, about why and how we should disaggregate
religion, and how that should play out for nonestablishment and
free exercise. Nonetheless, her case for the legitimacy of the
sovereign liberal democratic state is part of her overall
framework.
The case, as a wholesale matter, is faulty, and its flaws can
point us to a broad argument for exemptions, beyond religion.
Assuming the correlativity of arguments for political obligation
and legitimacy, 50 note that Laborde does not rely on arguments
from consent (express or implied) or duty of fair play; nor does
she rely on arguments from a natural duty to obey just institutions
or from associative obligation (what we owe each other as fellow
citizens). 51 Her position, rather, is a blend of arguments from
democratic political participation and the need for systemic
settlement. The former may be a necessary condition for political
obligation and legitimacy, but it is not a sufficient condition. 52
Whatever mechanism is established for majority rule, individuals
don’t knowingly and voluntarily cede self-government (we are
born into a society and rarely have the opportunity to swear an
oath to abide by majoritarian outcomes, and even such an oath
would be problematic if we lack sufficient alternatives). Minority
groups (of all sorts) are often not properly heard, and their
interests are insufficiently considered. Moreover, the problem of
the dead hand is real—constitutions and laws purport to govern
indefinitely, covering people who have not had an opportunity to
participate in their making, and the realities of political economy
make change cumbersome. Laborde’s argument, thus, necessarily
turns on there being some minimal democratic bona fides, plus
the need for a diverse, complex society to settle various matters
on which people disagree.
Arguments for a moral duty to obey the state’s laws (and
correlative arguments for the state’s claims of legitimate
authority) are meant to be general, to obligate and justify all state
claims of authority. 53 These claims may be subject to override in
individual instances, but the question up front is whether the
50. See GREENE, supra note 10, at 24–34. My arguments in this section are drawn
from chapters 1 and 2 of A GAINST OBLIGATION.
51. For the case that none of these arguments properly grounds political obligation
or legitimacy, see id. at 35–45, 56–94.
52. See id. at 45–56.
53. See id. at 15–17.
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general case for obligation and legitimacy can be made. The type
of general settlement argument Laborde offers is subject to
several objections. 54 One: The argument suffers from some of the
same flaws from which consent and democratic participation
arguments suffer: Who among us has consented to the political
system into which we are born and then live? If individual notions
of right—maybe we could call this conscience—are part of what
make each of us human and are not displaceable by superior
numbers and concretization over time, then “settlement” is just a
word for describing the ruling group’s assertion of authority. Two:
The argument from settlement does not properly account for
subgroups within a polity; their core contention is that the state’s
ground of authority is not valid as a trumping source just because
a majority of citizens have established it; other sources of
authority may exist, and although the state may properly prevail
in some instances, it can’t properly claim general valid authority.
This is a version of a core argument for political pluralism. Three:
Error costs exist in all directions. Although in many cases the state
may make correct (or at least best) decisions to settle reasonable
disagreement, in others, it may not; perhaps other persons, maybe
through non-state groups, can reach correct (or at least better)
answers to complex problems. The state’s general claim to
authority is too broad. Four: To the extent settlement arguments
rely on Burkean common law notions of true/best answers
working themselves out over time, they are subject to rejoinders
that powerful majority interests may control over time in a way
that does not properly obligate those out of power (with a
correlative hit to the state’s legitimacy claim) and that accretion
over time may represent mistakes building on mistakes and
becoming blind to error.
The general case for political obligation and legitimacy—
whether from the virtues of settlement or on other grounds—
cannot be sustained. Partly that is because of the flaws in the
various grounds, and partly that is because of the strength of the
case for robust political pluralism, i.e., for permeable
sovereignty. 55 We should treat all comprehensive views of the
54. See id. at 94–113.
55. See id. at 20–24. Jean Cohen refers to my work (and the work of others) as
advancing a kind of jurisdictional political pluralism. See Jean L. Cohen, Sovereignty, the
Corporate Religious, and Jurisdictional/Political Pluralism, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL
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good as presumptively on equal footing. The state’s claim to
authority is no more justifiable than, say, a claim based in
religious, tribal, or cultural norms. But the liberal democratic state
has a monopoly on armies and police and prisons, and so it is
subject to a distinctive justificatory burden. Since it cannot carry
that burden as a general matter, it must instead justify each law
and each application of law. Those who follow different sources
of normative authority—religious people, but others, too—thus
have two related grounds for complaint about the state’s claim of
authority just because it is the state: the general case for political
obligation and legitimacy fails, and pluralism rather than statemonism is the better approach to a world of plural claimed sources
of normative authority. Exemptions can serve as a kind of “partial
exit”; 56 although they don’t let people who follow non-state
sources of authority live purely on their own, they do achieve
some amelioration. Such a system requires balancing, but the
burden is on the state and not on the individual or group claimant.
This case for exemptions is not distinctive to religion and is
not meant as an interpretation of U.S. constitutional doctrine. As
a matter of ideal political theory, it can complement the more
localized case for religious exemptions based in the balance we
have struck between a robust Establishment Clause and a Free
Exercise Clause that takes seriously the hit to religious people not
just from discrimination but also from substantial burdens from
nondiscriminatory laws. (This is how that clause should work,
does work as filtered through federal and state RFRAs, and could
work were the Court to overrule Smith.) This more general case
for exemptions, not distinctive to religion, overlaps partly with
Laborde’s case. Both of us would apply a balancing test to
alleviate some burdens on persons whose commitments conflict
with state law. The main difference between our approaches is the
grounding for the claim against the state, for the claim that even
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 83 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon eds., 2017); Jean L. Cohen,
On Liberalism’s Religion, CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL., June 2018. She offers
several critiques of this position, which I will address in future work. Regarding Laborde’s
defense of the legitimacy of the sovereign democratic state, a view Cohen shares, see id.
Cohen notes the seriousness of the challenge from jurisdictional political pluralists, and
cautions that “we need more from Laborde on the jurisdictional question because I doubt
it will go away and I fear that those who do not accept the core intuition behind the notion
of liberal democratic state sovereignty (the primacy of civil law) are quite serious about
their projects.” Id. at 15. Indeed.
56. See GREENE, supra note 10, at 114–15; Greene, Kiryas Joel, supra note 20, at 8–
57.
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nondiscriminatory laws of general applicability must sometimes
(as a matter of right) give way. Laborde maintains that “the state
should generally refrain from infringing integrity-related
liberties” (p. 203); this is meant to protect “the values of identity,
autonomy, moral agency, and self-respect” (p. 204). My argument
is focused instead on competing sources of normative authority
from comprehensive views of the good. A constitution with a
capacious view of individual rights might cover some of what
Laborde wants to include in her argument for exemptions, but
protect them from laws that intentionally or directly infringe the
rights in question, rather than as incidental burdens from
otherwise valid laws of general applicability. If we are focused,
though, on exemptions (as Laborde is), then we do better by
approaching the matter from principles of political pluralism,
pitting competing comprehensive views of normative authority
against each other. 57
CONCLUSION
The dawn of the liberal democratic state marked a newfound tolerance for persons to practice religion in various forms.
Yet, finding the appropriate sweet spot for religion’s role in the
state and how state action may affect the lives of religious people
continues to be elusive. Cécile Laborde’s ambitious book
Liberalism’s Religion comes down firmly on the side of seeing
religion as not distinctive, even in a liberal democracy: To the
extent that nonestablishment and free exercise norms should
prevail, they should prevail insofar as we can disaggregate religion
into components that it shares with nonreligious belief and
practice. In this Review, I have advanced a position on which
Laborde spends little time in her book—religion is distinctive
because, for religious people, God is at the center of their beliefs
and practices, and there’s nothing else like it. In so doing, I have
suggested that there are good reasons for liberal democracy
generally, and the U.S. constitutional order specifically, to
respond to this sociological fact with nonestablishment and free
exercise norms that are distinctive to religious belief and practice.
57. Additionally, the “values” Laborde seeks to protect will ring true to
comprehensive liberals, but maybe not always or as much to persons who adhere to group
values less focused on, say, autonomy. This is another reason to favor an exemptions
approach based on competing sources of normative authority from comprehensive views
of the good and not on “integrity-related liberties.”
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Liberalism’s religion need not be disaggregative; it can remain
true to core liberal principles while taking seriously the role that
God plays in the lives of the devout.
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